Inflation: a sketch for a theory of world inflation by Seers, Dudley
3ft* /IP £
DISCUSSION PAPER
Preliminary m aterial and interim research results circulated  
to stim ulate discussion and critical comment
SEERS
COLLECTION
Inflation: A Sketch for a Theory 
o f W orld Inflation
by Dudley Seers 
D P 169 November 1981
Inflation: A Sketch for a Theory
of World Inflation 
by
Dudley Seers 
DP 169 
November 1981
In Discussion Paper 168 a framework for analysing inflation 
was derived from Latin America. This frame is used here as a 
classified checklist for the world as a whole. First I look 
at the industrial countries: 'these provide base levels of
inflation for the world economy, and they too are now 
suffering from chronic adjustment strains. The same is true 
of the world viewed as an economic unit, although the 
expansion of international liquidity - the analogue of 
national money supply - is also important. Finally, I look 
at world inflation in historical perspective. The price 
stability which lasted for a century up to 1914 depended 
basically on the absence of supply constraints and on the 
strength of one hegemonic power, Britain. There is now no 
plausible candidate for this role. Prospective shortages of 
oil and food, together with growing structural strains, 
suggest that attempts to impose strict monetary discipline on 
the world economy would prove, as in Latin America, socially 
damaging and ultimately self-defeating. However, what is 
really at issue is the future of the neo-colonial system.
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Inflation: A Sketch for a Theory
of World Inflation*
INTRODUCTION
Inflation is a world problem. In the last few years the world 
average rise in consumer prices has been over 10 per cent; in 
1979-80 it was 16 per cent - see Table 1 below.1 A rate of 
inflation of over 10 per cent is found now in nearly all 
countries, including some that have not previously known price 
increases of more than a few per cent a year in peacetime.
Table 1 Index of consumer prices: the world, 1952-1980
(1975 = 100)
1952 33
1957 37
1962 43
1967 54
1972 70
1973 77
1974 88
1975 100
1976 111
1977 124
1978 135
1979 152 P
1980 176 P
p preliminary
Source: International Financial Statistics, International
Monetary Fund.
The index is a geometric mean of national consumer 
price indices (112 in number for recent years) 
weighted by gross domestic products expressed in US 
dollars. Socialist countries are not covered. See 
'Measures of Global Inflation', Global Division, IMF, 
August 1979
The prelude to this paper is 'Inflation: The Latin American
Experience', Discussion Paper 168, IDS, Sussex, 1981. These 
two papers wj.ll be published together by the University of 
Notre Dame, either as a monograph or in a symposium on 
inflation. They are based on lectures I gave at Notre Dame 
earlier this year. I benefited very much from the discussions 
that followed the lectures, and also from comments by Ed Clay, 
Carlos Filgueira, Stephany Griffith-Jones and Hans Singer. 
Numerous lengthy and perceptive comments from Manfred 
Bienefeld were especially useful.
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It is also a world problem in another sense. Certain of the 
influences on prices can only be studied as global phenomena: 
not merely oil, but also the growth of the Euromone^ market, 
for example. Analysis of inflation in a single nation, 
however big its economy, can therefore only be partial.
Many would say that in order to explain world inflation we do 
not need any elaborate global analysis: the culprit is OPEC,
which engineered the ten-fold increase in the dollar price of 
oil in the eight years since the Yom Kippur war at the end of 
1973. But world inflation did not begin in 1973. After 
virtual stability in the middle of the 1950s, price rises 
were already starting to accelerate persistently in the 1960s, 
although oil prices were very low and indeed falling. In 1971 
and again in 1972, the average rate of world inflation on the 
IMF measure was six per cent, and in most individual countries 
it was faster than in the 1960s. It is true that oil prices 
were already starting to move upwards then, but not by nearly 
enough to cause such a big general price rise. In the first 
half of 1973 this reached eight per cent (at an annual rate). 
By then world consumer prices were already, on average, more 
than double what they had been two decades earlier. Moreover, 
prices of traded goods other than oil were rising rapidly, 
making it certain that world inflation would continue to 
accelerate in 1974. Oil has of course played an important 
part, but we have to look much further afield.
Two points should be made at the outset. First, it is not 
necessary for my present purpose, sketching a theory of world 
inflation, to make a detailed and comprehensive analysis on 
each plane. In order to cover this mammoth subject within the 
space allotted, in places I rely on generalisations that are 
not fully documented or adequately qualified.
Secondly, various government expenditures, eg social benefits, 
will be described as inflationary. There is no implication 
that these are simply on that account undesirable. They would 
be if inflation were the supreme economic evil, but this 
raises personal value judgements. Surely inflation is not 
intrinsically an evil at all: its undesirability is
instrumental - lying in the extent to which it causes true 
social evils, such as undernourishment and ill-health, and 
those who advocate a particular counter-inflationary policy 
will need to show that its social damage would be less.
Moreover, migration controls, import quotas, etc will be 
depicted as among the obstacles to world structural change. 
Here again there is no implication that for this reason any 
particular government should forego them: in the absence of
an international authority for redistributing income, each 
government has to secure what it perceives as its own 
national objectives as best it can. Similarly, the fact that 
fast population growth and big military expenditures aggravate 
world inflation is in itself no argument for any particular 
government checking them - though their internal effects,
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which include stimulating inflation, may well be best avoided.
I Causes of World Inflation
The discussion of Latin American inflation in Discussion Paper 
168 led to an explanation which can be briefly summarised as 
follows. Although structural change has been imperative it 
has been impeded, and the resultant price rises have been 
generalised by propagation mechanisms, including increases in 
the supply of money.
The main factors mentioned above can thus be grouped as 
follows:3
Prgspupes ion gtructural_chagge
- fast population increases;
- politically imperative requirements for social 
development;
- slow growth of food output;
- increasing dependence on imported oil;
- increasing dependence on imports of advanced 
industrial products.
Ob£t£cle§ to_s t,r gc£ugal change
- imperfections in labour markets;
- imperfections in capital markets;
- inadequate transportation;
- use of taxes for unproductive expenditures;
- bureaucratic regulations.
He£hanisms_ttjai gag propagate inflation
- trade unions, professional associations, landlords, 
etc acting to protect real incomes;
- monopolies (or oligopolies) in production and 
services;
- monetary authorities that accommodate price rises.
And behind all these lies the question whether the government 
has sufficient understanding, power and commitment to carry 
out structural change, involving heavy basic investments and 
also to enforce monetary discipline, ultimately a matter of 
the balance of political forces.
To examine every country to see whether this framework of 
analysis suited them would be a mammoth task.^ However, it is 
worthwhile pausing to ask whether the approach has any 
application to inflation in the industrial economies. In the 
first place, the weight of these countries in the world
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economy is considerable. Secondly, the price rise in a 
leading industrial country provides a base rate of inflation 
which can hardly be avoided by its trading partners 
(especially those with output consisting mainly of 'tradeable' 
goods and services).6 Thirdly, the monetary policies of their 
governments, as we shall see, affect considerably the 
liquidity of the world economy. Fourthly, this approach may 
bypass the heated but sterile debates between monetarists and 
Keynesians.6 However, since even this group of countries is 
very diverse I shall confine my illustrations to three of its 
leading members - the United States, Britain and Japan (price 
data for which are given in Table 2 below).7
Table 2 Index of consumer prices: industrial countries,
the USA, UK and Japan, 1952 to 1980 (1975 =100)
All
industrial
countries
USA UK Japan
1952 42 49 31 27
1957 45 52 35 32
1962 51 56 39 37
1967 58 62 46 49
1972 74 78 64 64
1973 79 83 69 72
1974 90 92 81 89
1975 100 100 100 100
1976 108 106 117 109
1977 117 113 135 118
1978 126 121 146 123
1979 137 135 166 127
1980 154 153 196 137
Source: same as Table 1
Some of the factors listed clearly have much less relevance 
to this group of countries. Population growth has been much 
slower in recent decades and food output has generally been 
at least keeping pace with domestic demand. Others are, 
however, applicable to some degree, although they take a 
different form in an industrial economy. While there is not 
the same moral and political imperative to eliminate 
widespread poverty, the need to reduce unemployment plays a 
similar role. So does the insatiable thirst for more public 
services, especially health and education, requiring continued 
expansion of the national income. Moreover the titivation of 
consumer greed by the media stimulates not merely the growth 
of consumption, but, as incomes rise, changes in its 
composition.
Most countries in this group have become heavily dependent on 
imported oil, which exposed them to the 'oil shocks'. This 
meant, for them too, foreign exchange bottlenecks and
-5-
pressures on the exchange rate, and required the development 
of local sources of energy (eg coal, nuclear power), shifts 
towards less energy-intensive goods and services, and 
increased conservation. It also intensified the battle for 
world markets in manufactures.
As in Latin America, there has been a growing tendency to 
import industrial products, but with different implications: 
in Latin America the imports are increasingly of producer 
goods and create structural dependence. In the big industrial 
countries consumer goods industries such as those making 
automobiles, television sets, etc have been threatened by 
imports, from Japan in particular, but also from TNC 
subsidiaries in the NICs. Still the consequences are similar, 
structural change has become necessary in industrial countries 
too, to make the penetrated industries more competitive, or to 
create new sources of employment for those displaced from them. 
At the same time, technological advances based on the 'chip', 
such as word processors and the use of robots, which have 
hardly reached Latin America yet, have also started to displace 
labour on an increasing scale.
The pattern of obstacles to the necessary structural shifts has 
also reflected those in Latin America, partially and with due 
modification - with due allowance for differences among 
industrial economies.
Inadequacies in capital markets and transportation systems are 
less serious than in Latin America; although bureaucratic 
regulation is far from negligible, it has greater inherent 
rationale and involves less delay or corruption. On the other 
hand, movement of labour to expanding industries has often been 
inhibited in thse countries too, especially in Britain, but by 
different obstacles - rent controls, subsidised public housing, 
corporate pension schemes, job tenure, 'featherbedding' and 
unemployment benefits that have become virtually unconditional 
and yield incomes which are not much below current wage levels.
Moreover, as in Latin America, money that would have otherwise 
financed investment in industry or new sources of energy, etc, 
has been diverted to unproductive ends by taxation (or 
government borrowing), whereas very high interest rates make 
basic investments unprofitable. In addition, much of the 
capital in the industrial countries has been exported to the 
NICs.
It is worth recalling the familiar point that while arms 
expenditure, which is heavy in Britain and the United States, 
increases purchasing power, as investment does, it does not, 
in contrast to investment, create capacity that would in due 
course augment the supply of goods and services and relieve 
shortages. Moreover, much expenditure on arms not only 
diverts finance from making economies more flexible: it also
increases the need for this flexibility, because it draws 
professional and skilled labour, energy, etc from other
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sectors. (Missile and anti-missile systems are both highly 
skill-intensive.)
A similar point can be made about the expansion of government 
services in the industrial countries (again, especially in 
Britain and the United States). Indeed, this is perhaps more 
significant an influence on inflation than in Latin America, 
where it is not merely relatively smaller: since output is
constrained there by ill-health and illiteracy, health and 
educational outlays have a much more direct impact on 
productive capacity. In particular, education and training 
are essential in Latin America for the shift of labour into 
secondary industry. In the industrial countries by contrast 
a large part of educational spending is at tertiary level, 
where education is undertaken largely as a form of consumption, 
treated as a civil right and not necessarily vocational.
The propagation of inflation must be powerful in the industrial 
countries too, with Japan again a partial exception; otherwise 
the effects of impulses such as each of the oil shocks would 
have died away sooner. The main reasons seem to be, perhaps 
more than in Latin America, the strength of industrial and 
financial corporations, and also of organisations to protect 
incomes, such as those of workers and farmers. Here too there 
is extensive indexation, either formally or in the sense that 
general price rises are treated as a yardstick in negotiations 
about wages, etc.® Trade unions in key sectors (such as coal) 
cannot be gainsaid and the rises they achieve reinforce the 
demands of others.
In many of these respects, the Japanese economy has become 
more flexible than that of the United States (and much 
more flexible than the British) despite heavy dependence on 
imports of oil and foodstuffs. This flexibility is shown by 
the relatively mild effect of the 'oil shocks' there, 
especially the second one.
Finally, although the governments of the leading industrial 
countries have a much more authentic basis for political power 
than those in Latin America, they too have failed to tackle 
structural change effectively, eg energy development and 
conservation. Indeed, partly to try to break the mechanism of 
propagation, they have usually tried to suppress the effects 
of rising oil prices on the prices of petroleum products, thus 
discouraging conservation and the development of new energy 
sources. They have also permitted, especially up to 1979, a 
fast enough increase in the money supply to accommodate price 
rises. I shall return to this point later because their 
conduct in this policy area has been a major factor in the 
propagation of world inflation.
Let me now discuss the applicability of the above list of 
influences on the world plane.
While the world's population has not increased quite as
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rapidly as that of Latin America, the rate has been 1.8 per 
cent in the 1970s. So the imperative of development has also 
applied to the world as a whole. Moreover, political pressures 
to solve social problems, including unemployment and under­
employment of various kinds, have become powerful everywhere. 
Related to this is a growing demand, spelled out (if vaguely) 
in the New International Economic Order, to change the 
distribution of world income, stimulated by the great and 
growing contrasts, between (say) on the one hand Frankfurt, 
Tokyo or New York, and on the other Calcutta, Accra or La Paz, 
contrasts of which people in the latter cities are increasingly 
aware. And what appears to those in the industrial countries 
as threatening forms of import penetration are, from a broader 
viewpoint, necessary changes in the structure of the world 
economy.
To assess whether there has been a 'food' bottleneck on the 
world scale is not straightforward - even if we confine our 
attention to the effective demand for food. Production has 
kept just ahead of the population increase, allowing a total 
rise of nearly one per cent a year in per capita output in the 
1970s.9 This was barely adequate to satisfy the rise in per 
capita income, even though that had slowed to 2% -3 per cent a 
year.
Besides, these global averages are not very helpful. The 
increase was fastest in the United States, Canada and Australia, 
where consumption levels were already the highest in the world 
and demand was growing slowly.10 Moreover, the spurt in 
output was partly at the expense of bringing back into use land 
which had been kept out of production by tne US Department of 
Agriculture. Elsewhere, because of constraints on food output, 
the expansion of arable land has become slow and world 
inventories of foodstuffs, including cereals, have fallen to 
precariously low levels. US dollar prices of food in 
international trade soared in 1973 (before the oil crisis) and 
though there was then a fallback, it was to much higher levels 
than previously: taking 1970 to 1979 as a whole they rose 2.7
times - faster than US prices in general, which roughly 
doubled.H
The energy constraint for the world as a whole has been more 
effective and more inescapable than for any particular nation. 
Governments could evade it - if the foreign exchange was 
available - by importing oil. The transnational 'modern' 
culture, which is highly energy-intensive (cars, central 
heating, air conditioning, refrigerators, etc) and its 
associated energy-intensive production technologies have been 
sweeping across the world. At first, this raised no supply 
problems: even the doubling of world oil consumption in the
1950s, and again in the 1960s, was offset by new finds in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. The world price of oil fell from 
$4 a barrel in 1950 to under $2 in 1970. But the net 
additions to proven world oil reserves declined to low levels 
in the mid-1960s and then the estimated oil in new discoveries
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each year began to be exceeded by consumption.12
During the early 1970s oil consumption continued to boom in 
both industrial and non-industrial countries because of the 
pattern of development briefly described above. Oil prices 
began to recover and the stage was set for them to start 
soaring at the end of 1973, on the outbreak of hostilities 
between Egypt and Israel. However, this seems merely to have 
anticipated what would have occurred before long anyway, 
because of the pressure of demand, though perhaps less sharply. 
One of its results was paradoxical: some oil exporting
governments in the Gulf, such as the Kuwaiti, have apparently 
a backward sloping curve, and the high price level itself 
caused them to reduce production, aggravating the basic market 
imbalance (quite apart from the effects of the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iracj-Iran war) .
The world economy is far from flexible enough to cope with 
such strains. Linguistic and other cultural barriers are much 
stronger discouragements to the movement of labour across 
national frontiers than inside them. It is true that the heavy 
migration of Mediterranean labour to Continental Western Europe 
from about 1960 to 1972, and of Caribbean labour to Britain and 
the United States (which also drew in Mexican workers), helped 
provide the manpower for the vigorous expansion of that period, 
especially in jobs, such as hotel work, which were unattractive 
to local labour. But this is not at all a worldwide phenomenon. 
For example, cultural homogeneity in Japan is apparently too 
strong to permit immigration (except for a trickle from Korea), 
despite the rapid growth in the need for labour. Moreover, 
such migration has always been controlled and the controls were 
tightened from 1972 on - before the oil crisis - by the 
governments of the recipient countries: labour needs,
especially for unskilled workers, were increasingly met by 
higher wages to domestic labour or by more intensive capital 
investment, raising costs. A new pattern of labour flows 
started towards the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, 
though the source was first largely Egypt and other Arab 
countries, and later Asia (especially South Korea).
Private capital for direct investment moves more readily 
between industrial economies, especially through the TNCs, but 
towards the rest of the world it has been inhibited, especially 
in oil and other minerals, by 'lack of confidence' due to the 
fear of expropriation or at least heavier taxation and controls 
on remittances of profits.^ Although commercial bank loans 
have increased dramatically, this has mostly been to a dozen or 
so 'creditworthy' economies with apparently stable governments 
and docile labour forces, such as Brazil and South Korea.1-” 
Certainly bilateral aid is spread more widely, but it is no 
longer increasing and is largely tied to the purchase of 
products from donor countries.
The scale of the world's non-productive expenditures, 
especially on arms, seems quite inappropriate in relation to
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the social imperatives in the world as a whole. While 
individual governments can claim that their level of military 
expenditure can be afforded without severe social costs, and 
perhaps that it is inescapable because of external threats, 
neither of these arguments are valid on the world plane (there 
is little danger, except in science fiction, of invasion from 
other worlds).
Looked at from a world viewpoint there cannot be any general 
foreign exchange shortage. However, the lack of currency 
convertibility not merely reflects, it also aggravates, 
structural problems. Thus the increment in world food 
production has gone in large part to raising the already high 
consumption in the industrial capitalist economies and to 
meeting the now chronic import needs of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. Imbalances appeared in many countries. 
Similarly, foreign exchange shortages inhibited the movement 
of oil and advanced industrial products, including capital 
equipment needed for investment in agriculture, oil and other 
basic sectors.
On the world scale, transportation costs have become more 
serious obstacles to movements of goods, especially heavy 
cargoes, since the price of oil soared, although this has been 
temporarily mitigated by surplus capacity in ships and aircraft.
There are also other barriers to movement which are not found 
within national economies. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
are too well known to emphasize here. The point is that they 
naturally reflect national interests in particular objectives 
such as checking the rise in unemployment, rather than optimal 
resource allocation. Such barriers to trade have increased in 
recent years, notably through the textile quotas imposed under 
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, and autarchic agricultural 
policies in the European Community. Very few of the growing 
arms contracts of the major governments are put out to open 
universal tender, although this would ease the shortages, 
especially of technical skills, these create.
The growth of TNCs must have increased world market 
imperfections. In many industries they prevent subsidiaries 
or licensees buying equipment or inputs freely or selling in 
certain foreign markets.15 They also form large nodes of 
quasi-monopolistic power that propagate inflationary impulses 
- the leading oil companies, for example. Cartels (such as 
the International Air Transport Association) have had a 
similar effect, as have some commodity agreements.
Another power group we have mentioned already in connection 
with Latin America has its counterpart on the world scale - 
international trade union federations. These try, inter alia, 
to raise wage levels in countries where these are particularly 
low, reducing competition with the working classes in the rich 
industrial countries.
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There were therefore structural reasons for world inflation, 
and many propagating factors. However, inflation would not 
have picked up such speed and momentum but for monetary 
expansion. Here we have to go back to the 1960s - to the 
simultaneous US entry into the Vietnam war and the expansion 
of the welfare state (the 'Great Society') without 
corresponding increases in taxes. This combination of policies 
not only unleashed inflationary pressures in the United States 
itself (mild by later standards): it led to a fast decline in
gold reserves and an outflow of dollars.16 Since the latter 
were treated as prime assets by foreign Central Banks, the 
result was a sharp rise in international reserves, a doubling, 
in fact, from 1969 to 1972.^
The Euromoney market which had come into being in the late 
1950s (mainly because of controls on interest rates in the 
United States and limits on branch banking) absorbed the bulk 
of this dollar outflow. Here credit could be created outside 
the control of any national government, and lent all over the 
world, often causing increases in reserves difficult for 
Central Banks (in Latin America as elsewhere) to sterilise.
The consequences for the world economy were analogous to those 
of monetary expansion in a national economy. The worldwide 
propagation of inflation was facilitated, and it could pick up 
spped.16 (See Table 1.)
The strain on the dollar led first to the abandonment of its 
external convertibility into gold, the world price of which 
started to climb, and then to the reorganisation (in 1971) and 
finally the collapse (early7 in 1973) of the whole system of 
fixed exchange rates set up at Bretton Woods. Governments 
faced with a foreign exchange crisis could now let currencies 
decline, as an alternative to imposing deflationary policies.
It is important to note, as I said at the beginning, that the 
Bretton Woods system collapsed before the cutting back of oil 
supplies at the end of 1973 and the sharp rise in oil prices. 
However, the oil shock naturally gave a further impetus to 
world inflation. Moreover, the big payments deficits in the 
oil-importing countries could be covered by borrowing their 
counterparts, the OPEC surpluses: so the rise in the price
of oil provided the money to enable this same rise to be 
financed in the Euromoney market. (The price rise could 
hardly have been so great in a more tightly managed world 
monetary system, although it is very doubtful whether even the 
gold standard in its heyday could have survived shocks of this 
magnitude.)
As the balance of the world market in oil improved, its real price 
declined somewhat from 1975 to 1978, but although the pace of 
world inflation abated slightly (see Table 1), the propagation 
mechanisms were too strong to permit general price declines. 
Indeed, inflation accelerated once more in 1979 when Iranian 
oil output fell by some five million barrels a day, following 
the revolution there at the end of the previous year. It was
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again facilitated by the same mechanism of expanding 
international liquidity.
So on the world plane too, both structural and monetary 
influences have to be taken into account, but, as in the case 
of Latin America, analysis must focus on political forces that 
prevent the solution of structural problems and compel monetary 
expansion. The interaction of economic and political 
developments will be examined in the next section.
II World Inflation in Historical Perspective
There was little net change in world prices over a whole 
century, from the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 to the start of 
the first World War in 1914. Although prices did sometimes 
rise during that period, they also at times declined.
It is widely believed that this long period of overall 
stability was due to the operation of the gold standard under 
the Bank of England's management. But a strict monetary regime 
was hardly needed. During this century population growth was 
slow; nationalist economic aspirations were weak; 
considerable areas of new land became available for cultivation; 
communications improved; supplies of coal, the prime fuel for 
expanding economies, were plentiful. There were vast movements 
of labour, first as slaves then under indenture arrangements, 
to man the plantations and mines. It is true that colonial 
rule secured for metropolitan firms the trade of the colonies 
and preferential access to their investment possibilities, but 
by comparison with the situation today, there were far fewer 
institutional obstacles to the movement of goods or capital: 
there was a prolonged and fast rise in trade in food and raw 
materials.
It was the colonial system that was really responsible for the 
absence of a price trend. The gold standard was nonetheless 
an important element in this system. Capital could flow out, 
confident that returns on it would be remitted homewards 
without any difficulty and that it could be repatriated at 
will. International liquidity was limited by the volume of 
gold output.
The gold standard needed a management that was not only 
hegemonic but also financially prudent. British governments 
were not, however, during this century, under irresistible 
internal pressure to adopt an expansionist monetary policy.
The colonial system remained sufficiently profitable to permit 
not only rising outlays on arms, but also increases in domestic 
wages, as trade unions became more powerful, and increases in 
social expenditures in response to the extension of the 
suffrage.
But an even more essential element was a political authority 
with sufficient strength, in the last resort military power.
-12-
to permit settlement of new lands and access to mines, and to 
ensure that the rules of the game were respected. The Royal 
Navy rather than the Bank of England preserved price 
stability.19
The gold standard was imposed on the colonies: even where,
as became increasingly frequent, a local currency was issued, 
this was fully backed by that of the metropolis, and therefore 
was similarly related to gold. The governments of the United 
States, the smaller countries of Western Europe and Latin 
America found the standard convenient: indeed if they were to
participate in the expansion of international trade they had 
little option but to keep their own currencies convertible.20 
At that time the alternative, exchange control, was hardly 
imaginable: financial unorthodoxy was punished by economic,
at times even military, action.
As the decades passed, British hegemony was gradually 
undermined by the rise of what can be called 'newly 
industrialising countries', especially Germany, which had the 
incentive and increasingly the power to challenge it, and did 
so in 1914. The war brought imperatives in some respects 
analogous to those of 'development': some types of output had
to be rapidly increased. At the same time it destroyed the 
worldwide trading system on which price stability ultimately 
depended. In Britain, where chronic needs had been created, 
under the colonial system, for imported food and industrial 
materials, few resources could be spared for exports to buy 
them.
It is true that the government could borrow heavily in the 
United States, but naturally it became unwilling to take on a 
bigger war debt than was absolutely necessary, and in any case 
imports were inhibited by the U-boats. Inflation could be 
temporarily suppressed by wartime controls on wages, but it 
burnt out soon after the war ended, until it was damped down 
by the restoration of supplies.
However, the significance of the change in the world power 
structure was not generally understood. In the 1920s the pre­
war monetary system was reassembled, but precariously, and, in 
retrospect, unfortunately. It was especially unfortunate for 
Britain itself, where an attempt was made to restore sterling 
as a convertible currency at the pre-war exchange rate. The 
demands of the unions, which had been stimulated in the 
colonial period, were now much more difficult to meet and a 
period of social confrontation opened, which was signalled by 
the General Strike of 1926, and still prevails more than half 
a century later. In the other industrial countries the 
restoration at first appeared successful: industrial
expansion was rapid until the world depression started to 
gather momentum at the very end of the decade.
But a government could then only stay 'on gold' by adopting 
deflationary policies. These not merely caused high levels of
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unemployment but also aggravated the problems of trading 
partners. The political cost of convertibility into gold 
became too high for one government after another; the gold 
standard was virtually ended by 1932, and protection increased. 
Some revival in output then took place and world prices 
started to rise (though it is difficult to assess how much 
this was due to war preparations, which were getting under 
way, especially in Germany).
The second world war caused an even bigger disruption of the 
world supply system than the first.21 The raw material 
suppliers accumulated unspendable currencies, especially 
sterling. By its end, the hegemony of Britain was finally- 
broken; its industries had been damaged by bombing and their 
re-equipment was long overdue. Powerful forces of nationalism 
had been unleashed, especially in Asian colonies taken over or 
threatened by the Japanese. Inventories had been run down, 
and heavy dollar debts were incurred. For the colonies 
independence started to become a political reality and later, 
in some degree, an economic reality too. Yet precisely at 
this time an attempt was made to convert Britain into a 
'welfare state'.
There was now only one candidate for the hegemonic role - the 
United States. Having been spared physical damage on its own 
territory during the war, it alone could take full advantage 
of technological advances; considerable gold reserves had 
been built up; its military power and political predominance 
were overwhelming. The dollar could thus serve as a unit of 
account and settlement, almost equivalent (as sterling had 
been) to gold when held by the central banks of other countries. 
Under the Bretton Woods agreement a system of convertible 
currencies was linked by fixed exchange rates to the dollar.
This was similar to the gold standard, though (memories of the 
World Depression being still fresh) with greater flexibility: 
an International Monetary Fund was set up in order to enable 
governments to meet short-period payment problems without 
retrenchment.
However, we must avoid the trap of looking at the new 
transnational economic system as essentially a monetary 
phenomenon. The Bretton Woods settlement provided, as the 
gold standard had done, merely one element in a system which 
can be called, not inaccurately, neo-colonial. Some of the 
main features of the colonial system were recreated, in 
particular the flow of private capital to the 'Third World', 
which still provided much of the primary produce needed by the 
industrial countries.
This system worked quite successfully for a while, from the 
viewpoint of its creators. It was able to withstand the 
disruption to commodity markets during the Korean War. But it 
depended on the hegemony of the United States and, just as had 
happened to Britain earlier, the basis of this, its 
technological lead, was gradually eroded. Productivity
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increased more rapidly elsewhere in the capitalist world, 
notably in Japan and West Germany. Moreover, US policies in 
the 1960s, outlined above, showed clearly that there was 
insufficient political backing for the total set of economic 
policies to be shaped in a way that would ensure the viability 
of the Bretton Woods settlement. The failure to achieve 
victory in the Vietnam war not merely carried military 
implications: it signalled (as the Bay of Pigs had done
earlier) inability to impose solutions on the periphery.
In the 1970s, the system disintegrated further with the 
collapse of the structure of fixed exchange rates mentioned 
above and the oil shocks. The price of gold soared and world 
monetary reserves grew ten-fold in one decade.22
This disintegration is often interpreted as having started in 
the 1970s, due to the abandonment of the Bretton Wood regime. 
But on the above analysis, it was fundamentally attributable 
rather to the structural strains which had been growing for 
some time - and the inability of the hegemonic power, the 
United States, to contain them (just as earlier Britain had 
failed to preserve the colonial system and its gold standard). 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system was a symptom, not a 
cause.
Something still remains, anyway - the IMF, in which the United 
States and other leading industrial countries exercise 
effective control. However, its function has drastically 
changed. Instead of being the means of avoiding the spread of 
recessions, it has taken over part of the disciplinary role 
once played by the Bank of England, under the gold standard. 
While it can provide some finance to ease payment problems, 
due for example to the oil price rise, the 'conditionality' on 
these drawings requires governments to take measures which in 
effect slow down rather than maintain their economic growth 
and spread a recession, rather than contain it. The Fund's 
behaviour shows that its first priority now is to see that 
countries remain fully integrated into the neo-colonial system, 
with convertible currencies. But it has relatively small 
resources - no direct military power - and can only exert much 
leverage on those members in severe foreign exchange 
difficulties: this means it has little influence on the
governments of many industrial countries or on those that 
export oil. The coherence of its policies is further weakened 
by disagreements between the Executive Directors appointed by 
the governments of the leading industrial countries, and it 
has more recently shown itself vulnerable to pressures from 
other governments to relax conditionality and increase 
disbursements. There is, in brief, no longer any effective 
management of the currencies of the neo-colonial system..
Let us now turn to the future. The folk memory of the century 
of price stability still powerfully influences popular 
perceptions: it is widely believed that this is the natural
state of affairs, which will be restored when proper policies
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are adopted, especially proper monetary policies. On the above 
analysis price stability seems very unlikely, whatever policies 
are pursued in the monetary field: the attempt to impose it
would mean such a sharp deflation as to be politically 
unacceptable.
The requirements for far-reaching structural change are 
unlikely to moderate in the industrial countries. Further 
penetration of their markets will be difficult to avoid,with 
South Korea and the other newly industrialising countries 
following the example of Japan. The labour-saving innovations 
mentioned above will be introduced at an accelerating pace. 
Moreover, the defence industries will continue to grow more 
rapidly than the civil economy, especially in the United States.
Nor is there much sign that the obstacles to internal labour 
mobility are being dismantled, except for a reduction in real 
unemployment benefits and housing subsidies in some countries. 
The capital needed for reorganisation of each economy, 
including investment in new energy sources, is still being 
partly pre-empted by the increase in arms expenditure and 
overseas investment (especially investment in the NICs).
While unions have been weakened somewhat by the high levels of 
unemployment, it would be premature to expect them to acquiesce 
indefinitely in declines in real wages. Similarly the farm 
lobbies are likely still to be effective in protecting the 
real incomes of their constituents. The recession has caused 
the bankruptcy of many small firms and anti-trust legislation 
is being relaxed in the USA, so the degree of monopoly in the 
1980s may well be higher than in the past.
In the United States the combination of big increases in arms 
expenditure and tax cuts seems likely to lead not merely to 
greater structural strains of the sort already discussed but 
also to continued, if not greater, budget deficits, 
facilitating the propagation of inflation. It is true that 
there are supposed to be big reductions in social expenditure 
and increases in tax revenues are predicted due to the stimulus 
to activity provided by lowering tax rates: this derives from
the 'supply side' approach now fashionable in some circles 
close to (and in) the White House. However, that seems not 
merely highly optimistic but incompatible with another official 
doctrine, monetarism, which is specifically attacked by one of 
the exponents of this school, George Gilder (Wealth and 
Poverty. Basic Books, 1981).23 The attempt to encompass both 
these doctrines is an apparent flaw in the economic philosophy 
of the Reagan administration: unless the stimulus provided by
the tax cuts to income overwhelms the depressing effect of 
restrictive monetary policies.
Experience in the last two years in Britain, where a similar 
programme has been in operation, suggests that growth is not 
in fact at all responsive to a reduction in direct taxes. On 
the contrary, the consequence of this mixed package has been
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that, in order to reduce inflation, the authorities here relied 
heavily on the one remaining policy instrument, the rate of 
interest. So in fact the national product lias fallen, instead 
of rising, and tax revenues are much lower than expected. 
Moreover, the consequent increase in unemployment has created 
demands for redundancy benefits and welfare spending, making 
the difficult task of cutting public expenditure still harder.24 
As in Latin America, attempts to impose monetarist solutions, 
where the roots of inflation are not monetary, are proving 
counter-productive.
This comparison should not be pushed too far. The US economy 
is much more self-sufficient and flexible than the British: 
the obstacles to labour mobility are weaker and so is trade 
union power.25 Nevertheless, there are other reasons for 
expecting inflation to continue in the industrial countries, 
maintaining the 'base rates' of world inflation. When 
inflation became fast, by historical standards, there was 
widespread support for counter-inflationary policies, but, as 
unemployment and bankruptcies became increasingly severe, and 
social unrest spreads, concern with inflation evaporates, 
monetarism becomes discredited, and political forces that 
favour the expansion of demand start to predominate. This has 
already happened in France and attitudes are changing rapidly 
in Britain too. Moreover, the main initial effect of a 
resurgence in demand is on productivity: so the demand
stimulus will have to be large to make much impact on 
unemployment.
Inflation could well accelerate again at that point, 
especially if the expansionary policies take forms that 
aggravate 'bottle-necks', which have in many cases grown more 
acute in the last few years because of the low level of 
investment (eg in transport and communications) due to 
monetarist policies. Governments may find it not merely 
technically but also politically impossible to maintain 
ceilrngs on the money supply. The experience of Argentina 
and Brazil is compelling: even in an economy where monetarism
is the official doctrine, and working class organisations have 
been weakened or destroyed, a military junta finds it 
impossible, as explained in Discussion Paper 168, to contain 
inflation.
An acceleration of inflation in the industrial countries could 
mean not merely that the base rates of world inflation would 
rise: in addition world liquidity would be increased by
outflows of dollars and other acceptable currencies.
But we must not fall into the trap of concentrating attention 
purely on monetary factors. The basic strains in the world 
economy are after all what cause the growth in liquidity. The 
rate of world population increase is subsiding only very 
slowly, with declines in the birth rate being partially offset 
by continued falls in the death rate. It will not fall much 
below 1.7 per cent in the 1980s. In addition, the political
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pressures for 'closing gaps' are by no means easing.
When world economic growth is resumed, the outcome could well 
be renewed increases in world oil prices. There have been 
signs in the industrial countries of oil consumption 
responding to the changed price relationships, and the income 
elasticity of demand may now have fallen below unity, at 
least the long-term elasticity.26 But despite the repeated 
demonstrations of the dependence of industrial countries on 
imported oil, prospects are not favourable for accelerated 
development of domestic sources of energy. In the United 
States, the effects of decontrolling the price of domestic oil 
remain to be seen, while there, as elsewhere, public opposition 
is thwarting the development of nuclear power. Moreover, 
subsidisation of the development of new sources of energy is 
paradoxically being cut back, as part of the counter- 
inflationary programme! In the United Kingdom, even investment 
by the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) has been 
checked by arbitrary limits to the 'public borrowing 
requirement' (which force BNOC to compete for funds with, eg 
the British Steel Corporation and British Rail, both of which 
have capital needs that are as insatiable as they are 
politically compulsive), and private companies complain that 
the tax regime makes further oil development unprofitable.
In 1981 oil prices started to ease, but the world oil market 
is only precariously balanced. Consumption is rising rapidly 
in oil exporting countries themselves, especially those with 
large populations - Mexico, Nigeria, Indonesia and Venezuela. 
There are prospects of increased output in new exporters 
(Egypt for example), but many governments will no doubt 
continue to hold production well below capacity (as Kuwait ana 
Norway are doing). A great deal depends on the level of Saudi 
production, which is sensitive not merely to possible political 
upheavals in the (highly unstable) Gulf area, but also to 
changes in depletion policy, which could be influenced by US 
policy on Israel.
A resumption of economic expansion would also reveal shortages 
in many minerals (such as copper) where recently investment 
has been low, partly because of political uncertainties. Thus 
a number of potential bottlenecks in the world economy could 
inhibit expansion. Food output seems unlikely to grow at a 
faster rate than one per cent ter capita. In addition to all 
the institutional obstacles, it is now increasingly affected 
by the higher price of oil-based inputs such as tractor fuel 
and fertilisers, especially in the many countries suffering 
from foreign exchange difficulties. Yet this rate would not 
be nearly fast enough to meet the needs of a resurgence of the 
world economy if oil supplies permitted this. The dangerous 
world food shortage which emerged in 1972 was subsequently 
alleviated more by a moderation in the rise of consumption 
than by a spurt in production.27 so one can point to a latent 
food constraint, which the oil constraint temporarily masks.28
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Yet the world economy is unlikely to become more flexible. 
Increases in oil prices continue to raise transportation costs 
and tightening protection is diverting demand to higher-priced 
domestic sources (eg of cars). While the expansion of 
bureaucracies may well have levelled off, the growth of world 
military expenditures is accelerating. Migration controls are 
hardly likely to be eased; indeed, the Middle East oil 
exporters are now showing increasing concern about the 
political implications of dependence on their immigrant workers, 
and are reducing their rates of expansion. Nor do political 
developments suggest that capital will flow more readily, 
especially for direct investment.
World liquidity looks likely to continue growing at a fast 
rate, not merely because of the probable easing of monetarist 
policies in the leading industrial countries, discussed above, 
but also because there is now a much greater pressure by the 
oil-importing countries, especially the NICs, and by their 
creditors, for increased lending by the World Bank and the IMF, 
and on easier terms.29
There seems little prospect that we shall again see hegemonic 
management of the international monetary system, such as that 
maintained by Britain in the 19th century, and the United 
States more briefly (and less rigorously) in the quarter 
century starting in 1945. Not even the United States is now 
capable of imposing political hegemony on the rest of the world 
- and if there is one lesson in the experience of Britain and 
other former imperial centres, it is that it is most unwise to 
attempt to hang on to power after the objective basis for it 
has disappeared.
Divergences in interests seem to rule out a 'collegiate' 
control by the leading industrialised countries, unless there 
is a very serious crisis, such as a Saudi revolution 3 1'Iran 
(and the monetary consequences of this could hardly be 
contained anyway). The European Monetary System limits 
(though it does not exclude) the possibility of exchange rate 
changes, but the Community has not so far acquired the 
technological leadership, the military power, or even 
sufficient agreement on policy to make the European Currency 
Unit a dominant world currency. The Arab oil exporters lack 
these requirements even more markedly, as well as the 
institutions to establish financial hegemony.
But the search for a new world authority of some kind is a 
chimera. Even if it could be created the implications of my 
analysis, at the levels of Latin America in Discussion Paper 
168 as well as the industrial countries and the world, is that 
this is not a sufficient condition for price stability when 
major and difficult structural changes are necessary. To bring 
inflation universally to an end, for example, by reimposing a 
gold standard, could only be managed, as in the inter-war 
period, by deflationary policies so severe and so prolonged 
that the cure might well be worse for nearly all parties than
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the disease - and could not be maintained.
There is thus good reason to expect a continuation j.n world 
inflation. Any government that promises to restore national 
price stability is talking about a variable over which it has 
only limited influence.
Ultimately, the stability of world prices is part of a much 
larger issue, the strength of the neo-colonial system as a 
whole. This - like the socialist system of Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, though in different ways - generates 
political and economic aspirations it cannot satisfy. World 
inflation is a symptom of this, just as inflation in any 
particular country in Latin America has been, in part, a 
symptom of unresolvable internal strains.
One possible solution would be to try to restore the viability 
of the neo-colonial system by increasing aid and private 
investment, facilitating further expansion of exports of 
manufactures from the NICs, and of advanced industrial products 
from the industrial countries, etc. This is the strategy 
spelled out in the Brandt Report and proposed in the 'New 
International Economic Order' by those in the South who have 
benefitted from the system. Policies of this kind may be 
attempted; yet their very success in stimulating world 
economic growth would aggravate structural tensions, especially 
the latent shortages of oil and food, but also the faster 
penetration of the industrial economies by TNC subsidiaries 
based in the NICs. The result would be an acceleration of 
world inflation, not its elimination, and the social costs in 
the industrial countries would be heavy.20
For them, the system in its present form is becoming perhaps 
too expensive to salvage. A strategy which is becoming more 
plausible would be to reduce the flows of private capital and 
aid and their inseparable companions, political and military 
intervention. This would respond to aspirations in many 
developing country governments for greater self-reliance. More 
limited regional economic blocs with a high degree of self­
sufficiency could emerge, for example, the Western Hemisphere.2! 
There is no space, nor is it necessary, to spell out the details 
here, but clearly in such groups it would be easier to establish 
and capital could more easily be mobilised, especially for the 
development of oil and other minerals. Such a bloc could become 
capable of covering its own energy and food needs by joint 
plans and long-term purchase agreements, and restricting the 
entry of manufactures, especially from Japan and the East Asian 
NICs, but allowing a good deal of competition internally. A 
successor of this type to the neo-colonial system would enable 
employment to be raised with less effect on the rate of 
inflation. It would also facilitate the preservation of world 
peace. Regional redistribution of economic power, and at least 
relaxation of migration controls within the region, would be 
indicated, but this is a much more feasible task than worldwide 
redistribution, or a general open door policy on labour 
movement.
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But perhaps this would not go far enough to meet nationalist 
aspirations, for example in Latin America, and it may impose a 
politically unrealistic burden on the industrial and oil- 
exporting countries at the core of such a system. In that 
case, one could expect more culturally defined regional blocs 
- Latin America and North America as separate blocs, for 
example, rather than Western Hemisphere (which would not rule 
out a continuation, though in a different form, of a special 
relationship between Latin America and North America).
Until and unless such regional groupings become effective, 
national policies are bound to become more autarchic. Those 
of Latin American oil-importing countries, for example, will 
have to modify considerably the existing growth patterns in 
both production and consumption, which have involved 
increasing imports of energy and food and rapidly rising debt. 
So - except in Argentina perhaps, which is self-sufficient in 
essentials - inflation seems bound to accelerate these. It is 
important for all parties that governments in the industrial 
countries should see the logic of these developments, and not 
try to preserve the neo-colonial system by concluding 
unrealistic international agreements (based on NIEO) by 
attempting to re-establish a strict global monetary system, or 
by political or military intervention.
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NOTES
1. The data in this paper were kindly provided by the 
International Monetary Fund; the (weighted) geometric mean 
used to average national consumer price indexes is less 
affected than an arithmetic mean by the very high rates of 
inflation in a few countries.
2. The unit value index of world food trade (fob) rose by 36 per 
cent between 1972 and 1973 (1979 Trade Yearbook. FAO, 1980) .
3. The classification is somewhat arbitrary. Each of the 
factors that normally propagate inflation could in principle 
help initiate it. Moreover, some factors are linked: thus 
the population increase was partly responsible for increased 
dependency on imports of food and oil, and what is shown as 
an obstacle to structural change can also be a reason why it 
is neeaed (eg transportation inadequacies).
4. Serjit Ehalla in William R. Cline and Associates, World 
Inflation and the Developing Countries (The Brookings 
Institution, 1981) does in fact come to the conclusion that 
for the 29 developing countries covered in his econometric 
study for 1956-75, neither monetary nor structural factors 
are adequate in themselves. A hybrid is necessary. He obtains 
a higher 'explanation' of increases in consumer prices oy 
allowing not only for relative food prices but also import 
prices, in addition to the money supply. I am hesitant about 
relying heavily on this as supporting evidence, however, 
because of doubts not only about the quality of price data 
but also whether regression between time series can bear 
sophisticated analysis, and measure the impact of the factors in
a complex inflationary process that can vary so much between 
periods, especially since the choice of dependent variables 
to be tested seems arbitrary and omits non-quantifiable 
factors.
5. The base rate is in a degree regional: the rates of inflation 
in the United States and El Salvador have been roughly 
similar. Similarly, Japanese inflation now provides a base 
rate for East Asia, French for Francophone West Africa,
German for Southern Europe, etc.
6. Anglophone economists do not seem to have been very 
successful (either the Keynesian or the monetarist schools) 
in analysing inflation and prescribing remedies in their own 
countries. Perhaps an approach based on Latin American 
experience may be more fruitful.
7. It would also be interesting to apply this framework to the 
socialist countries of Europe which show many of the same 
structural problems, compounded in some cases by even 
greater bureaucratic resistance to economic change; I have 
neither the knowledge nor the space to attempt this here.
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8. Although the trade unions are stronger than in Latin 
America, we should not forget the lesson mentioned in 
Discussion Paper 168, that breaking the power of the unions 
and relaxing indexation does not prevent fast inflation 
(even in Argentina at a 3 digit rate).
9. 1979 Production Year Book, FAO, 1980.
10. Some food is redistributed by food aid, but this declined 
in absolute terms during this decade (Food Outlook, FAO, 
1979).
1 1 . 1979 Trade Year Book. FAO, 1980. The price of wheat (No 2 
Hard Red Winter fob Gulf) which had been fairly stable up 
to 1972, at below $2 a bushel, jumped to over $4 in the mid 
1970s.
12. Reserves did, however, temporarily rise again in the late 
1970s as major new discoveries were announced, especially
in Mexico (and world oil consumption grew much more slowly).
13. Between 1970 and 1973, more than 80 per cent of total 
mineral exploration in the non-socialist world was 
concentrated in Australia, Canada, South Africa and the 
United States (UN Development Forum. 1978 : 1). The 
developing countries' share of European companies' total 
exploration expenditures fell from 57 per cent in 1961 to 
13.5 per cent in 1973-75 (The Courier, Brussels, 1978,
No 49). See Gerald Helleiner, Intra-Firm Trade and the 
Developing Countries. Macmillan, 1981 : 23. Peter Odell 
estimates that 'Latin America, Africa and S.E.Asia contain 
almost 50 per cent of the world's total potentially 
petroliferous regions (excluding Antartica and the deep 
oceans). To date however petroleum development efforts in 
these regions have been minimal. They have amounted - and 
continue to amount - to less than five per cent of the 
worldwide effort' ('Oil and Gas Potential in Developing 
Countries and the Prospects for its Development',
Economisch Geografisch Instituut, Rotterdam, Working Paper 
Series A, 1980, No 1).
14. Tony Killick, 'Eurocurrency Market Recycling of OPEC 
Surpluses to Developing Countries: Fact or Myth', in 
Christopher Stevens (ed), EEC and the Third World: A 
Survey■ Hodder and Stoughton for ODI/IDS, 1981.
15. See Gerald Helleiner, 'World Market Imperfections and the 
Developing Countries', in W.R. Cline (ed), Policy 
Alternatives for a New International Economic Order.
Praeger, 1979. In his 1981 study cited above (p 10) he 
shows that in 1977 48 per cent of US merchandise imports 
originated in 'related parties' (ie firms with at least 
five per cent US ownership of the voting stock). This 
excludes the sales of companies linked more loosely to US 
corporations. (Comparable data are not available for
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other industrial countries.)
16. As Robert Tnffin has pointed out on a number of occasions 
(for example in a paper presented at a conference in IDS
in June 1980), this outflow was not, as is often mistakenly 
alleged, due to deficits in the United States current 
balance of payments. Broadly the current account was in 
balance at this time, taking one year with another. The 
point is that there was no surplus in it in spite of the 
returns on past investments (which appear as a credit in 
the current account, even if never remitted home). Yet a 
big surplus was needed to finance the heavy outflow of 
capital, especially foreign aid and the big investments 
overseas.
17. Moreover, Special Drawing Rights were now being issued.
The initiative to create these was taken in the 1960s, when 
there were (justifiable) fears of a shortage of 
international liquidity. By 1970 when they were actually 
first issued, total reserves were ceasing to be inadequate 
but SDRs were able to take on a different function, 
supplementing the dollar as a unit of account. See James 
Morrell, The Future of the Dollar and the World Reserve 
System. Butterworth, 1981.
18. An explanation of the association between changes in 
reserves, monetary stocks and price rises in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s is to be found in Robert Heller, 
'International Reserves and Worldwide Inflation', IMF Staff 
Papers, March 1976.
19. Political power seems to play an even bigger role in world 
price trends than for individual countries. The reason, 
perhaps, is that governments do not have such difficulty 
making possible the movement of goods, labour or capital 
from one part of a country to another.
20. Manfred Bienefeld has pointed out to me that Kenneth 
Galbraith drew attention to the positive effects of 
'financial irresponsibility' in the United States in the 
19th century, especially in the high risk expansion of the 
frontier Westward: no doubt this could be accommodated
successfully because of the immense yields in foodstuffs 
and minerals (which also made it unnecessary for the United 
States government to mount a military challenge to British 
hegemony).
21. The price rise would have been even faster but for a 
duopsonistic system of purchasing commodities run by the 
governments of Britain and the United States.
22. The dollar has continued to be treated as a prime asset, 
just as earlier sterling continued for some decades as a 
reserve currency after British hegemony had been 
undermined.
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23. It also differs from a structural approach, however 
(which emphasizes the supply side too), in being highly 
aggregative: it focuses attention on the presumed 
elasticity of total output with respect to changes in tax 
rates.
24. Indeed in Britain where - as now in the United States - a 
series of annual reductions in income taxes was planned, 
there was only one and this was partially reversed 
subsequently (in the sense that personal allowances were 
not adjusted for inflation).
25. In the UK more than half the non-agricultural employees 
are in unions and the proportion was rising in the 1970s; 
in the US the corresponding ratio is less than a quarter 
and the trend has been downward.
26. The 1973-78 average growth rate in world oil consumption 
was 1.3 per cent (even lower if one excludes the Soviet 
bloc) compared to over 7 per cent in the 1960s. This does, 
however, reflect a response to rising prices as well.
27. See Raymond Hopkins and Donald Puchala, Global Food Inter­
dependence . Columbia U.P., New York, 1980 : 18, for an 
assessment, from a liberal US viewpoint, of world food 
trends and prospects, including prospective deficits in 
the 1980s. See also Global 2000, Report of the US 
Presidential Commission, 1981.
28. There is now a link between food and oil supply, because 
some food crops can be converted into ethanol. (A second, 
weaker link is that off-shore mining interferes with 
fishing.) Consequently, as oil prices rise, more land 
will be used for fuel crops, and the reverse will happen 
as they fall. Because of time lags, one constraint or the 
other will always be dominant, but in the longer term 
there will be single land use constraint.
29. Also central banks have not fully revalued their gold 
stocks. When this happens (eg on their sale), their 
assets will rise, permitting a corresponding increase in 
their liabilities.
30. See my 'North South: Muddling Morality and Mutuality',
Third World Quarterly. October 1980, Vol II, No 4.
31. See my 'The Second Enlargement of the EEC in Historical 
Perspective', in Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos 
(eds), The Second Enlargement of the EEC: Integration of 
Unequal Partners. Macmillan, forthcoming, also as an 
IDS Discussion Paper 158, for a discussion of the 
possibility of greater self-reliance in Western Europe. A 
move in this direction in the Western Hemisphere is the 
Mexican-Venezuelan undertaking to supply oil to the 
Caribbean on easy credit.
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